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Reflections on the Nature of the State: Sovereignty, Power and
Responsibility
Joel P. Trachtman*

In this essay, I will attempt in a preliminary manner to consider sovereignty from an economic perspective.' Most, although not all, commentary on sovereignty comes from a political perspective, and within
the international law community, is dominated by the more political
side of international law, public international law. This public international law perspective emphasizes issues such as secession, human
rights and humanitarian intervention. I will examine sovereignty from
an international economic law standpoint, focussing on issues of economic regulation such as extraterritoriality and subsidiarity.
This essay revolves around three epithets: sovereignty, extraterritoriality and subsidiarity. Each lacks content - none can, simply by its
invocation, indicate the course of decisions. In intergovernmental negotiations, or in domestic negotiations regarding international policy,
claims of "sovereignty," "extraterritoriality" and "subsidiarity" should
be greeted with suspicion, if not derision. While the issues that they
raise are the most important and difficult in social science, these words
do not answer questions, but only raise questions. Each relates to
claims of a state, or claims against the state. Each of these epithets can
be seen as a conflict of laws problem. "Extraterritoriality" raises the
question of horizontal conflict of laws. "Subsidiarity" raises the question of vertical conflict of laws. Finally, we may view sovereignty as the
power and responsibility left to the state when horizontal and vertical
claims of extraterritoriality and subsidiarity have been collated and integrated. The goal of this essay is to indicate some possible paths toward defining, analyzing and relating these three epithets.
I.

THE RHETORIC OF SOVEREIGNTY

Those who are concerned about the formal imposition of constraints on national action under the proposed World Trade Organization or NAFTA, or about the formal legislation of centralized regulation, preempting national action, in the European Union, use the
Professor of International Law, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.
This essay is a revised version of a presentation made to the Canada/U.S. Law Institute's

*Associate
I

Conference on "Sovereignty in the North American Context and in an Changing World," held
from April 22-24, 1994. I wish to thank the other participants in the conference for their helpful
comments, and especially Professor Henry King for his encouragement and stimulation of my
thinking in this area.
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epithet "sovereignty." 2 Mexicans who reject U.S. efforts to tell them

how they should fish for tuna,' and Europeans who reject U.S. efforts
to apply its antitrust or securities laws to European conduct or persons
under the "effects" doctrine also use this epithet. They mean by this
that the state should not give up too much authority, or should not give

up more authority, or should not give up authority in a particular area.
The rhetoric of sovereignty tends to view the problem, incorrectly,

as a quantitative, rather than qualitative, one. In order to understand
sovereignty, we must first recognize a "law of conservation of sovereignty."
Sovereignty, viewed as an allocation of power and responsibil4

ity, is never lost, but only reallocated. The attractiveness of a reallocation of sovereignty should be measured by reference to whether it
allows social goals to be achieved more effectively. Thus the question

raised regarding the reallocation is whether the recipient of enhanced
power and responsibility will exercise power and recognize its responsibility more effectively.
When a state's sovereignty is reduced, the important question
raised is where the sovereignty goes, and how the citizens of the state
may exercise power, and call on responsibility. That is, it may be

viewed as a question of what is received, and by whom, in exchange for
a reduction in the state's sovereignty, rather than simply a question of

whether sovereignty is reduced. The question of what is received refers
to the concept of "pooling of sovereignty" 5 that has been compelling in

the context of the European Union: by giving up national sovereignty,
member states may increase the scope of their influence, both within

the European Union and in external relations. One part of this calculus
relates to the cost-benefit analysis between the degree of local auton-

omy given up and the measure of influence over other sovereigns obtained. Thus, if the U.K. had been able to bind Austria, Norway, Sweden and Finland to the European Union, without giving up the measure
of ability to block European Union legislation that it had prior to their
2

Many have noted the strange bedfellows that have rushed to the defense of "sovereignty" in

connection with the proposed World Trade Organization. See, e.g., Nader, Buchanan, Others
Urge Clinton to Delay Consideration of GATT Accord, Daily Report for Executives (BNA) at
151 (Aug. 9, 1994); "Sovereignty is so emotive a term that it very naturally finds an important
place in international rhetoric. Any proposed diminution of a state's political freedom or legal
jurisdiction is likely to evoke a response which will be expressed, in part at least, as a defence of
its sovereignty." ALAN JAMES. SOVEREIGN STATEHOOD: THE BASIS OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 1
(1986).
1 See United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, No. DS21/R, 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991).
This panel report was not adopted by the GATT Council, and the European Community subsequently brought another action on similar grounds. See United States-Restrictions on Imports of
Tuna, No. DS29R, 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994).
1 By juxtaposing "power" and "responsibility" I mean to signal that I am using "responsibility" to include a sense of responsiveness and a bilateral relationship between the person responsible and the persons to whom the responsibility is owed.
8 JAMES, supra note 2, at I and notes 1-2.
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entry, it would have obtained greater foreign influence without a net
additional expenditure of local autonomy.'
The question of what is received, and by whom, in exchange for a
reduction of state sovereignty refers, in effect, to the "democratic deficit." The democratic deficit arises when the most directly democratic
element of member state government -

the parliament -

gives up

power to the European Union, which power is dependent upon the vote
in the Council of the less directly democratic element of member state
government - the executive. In this light, the democratic deficit is really a deficit of directness of democracy. It can be reduced by allocating more power in the European Union to the branch that is directly
responsive to the people: the European Parliament. This is important to
concerns about sovereignty, because it denies the mediating role of the
member state government: the member state transfers sovereignty to
the European Union, which is no longer simply a creature of member
states, but is directly responsible to the people of Europe. This is not a
simple pooling of sovereignty among executives, but a restructuring of
relationships in which the fount of authority is recognized as the
people.
II. AN

INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE

Each man's experience starts againfrom the beginning. Only institutions grow wiser: they accumulate collective experience, and owing
to this experience and this wisdom, men subject to the same rules
will not see their own nature changing, but their behaviour gradually transformed.7
This essay proceeds from the premise that "history . . .is largely
a story of institutional evolution .. . ." Institutions freeze the opera-

tion of the market or freeze politics temporarily to reduce transaction
costs. Institutions also change over time, as old institutional structures
fail to reflect social needs, and new or revised institutional structures
are devised and negotiated to meet social needs more accurately. We
find that the ontogeny of our generation's society recapitulates its phylogeny: that the history of our institutions is still visible in varied and
sometimes embedded forms, despite the continuation of institutional
evolution. Thus, this essay examines sovereignty as a socially contingent phenomenon, as an institution. It is an institution insofar as it is a
I See, e.g., No Breakthrough on Blocking Minority Issue; Ministers Adjourn Talks, EuRoMarch 23, 1994. In Spring, 1994, the U.K. and Spain for a time blocked accession
of these four countries to the European Union, hoping to maintain their voting rights undiluted.
I Jean Monnet, quoting Swiss philosopher Henri-Frederic Amiel (1821-81), in the course of
a speech to the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1955, quoted
by D.G. GOYDER,EEC COMPETITION LAW 69 (1988).
8 Id.
PEAN REPORT,
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ready-made template or constraint for social relations.9 While this in-

stitution is subject to evolution, evolution rarely entails revolution.
The definitional convention adopted in this essay is that "sover-

eignty" is the set of powers of any particular state, recognizing that
this set of powers has evolved significantly since 1648, and that this set

of powers differs among states. 10 Thus sovereignty is contingent, both
inter-temporally and intra-temporally."1 Furthermore, in this sense,
"sovereignty" and the "state" are congruent. Indeed, those who separate the "state" from its "sovereignty" assume some artificial life for
the state, as though the state is more than a bundle of powers and
responsibilities. Just as a corporation, in analytical terms, is no more

than a bundle of powers and responsibilities-a bundle of legal relationships-

12

so too is a state no more than a bundle of powers and

responsibilities. To say otherwise is artificially to deify or humanize this
institution.
Bodin deified sovereignty, defining it as supreme power over citizens and subjugated peoples, bound by no other law.' 3 This vision of a

sovereignty of unilateral domination and dominion appears increasingly
alien, not to mention bleak, to us today. Most kings or queens reigning
today are figureheads, and we know that neither our executives nor our
legislatures are divine. Consequently, we increasingly think of the state

in bilateral terms, subjecting it to the requirement that it provide benefits at least equal to its costs.' 4 We are no longer so willing to "ask not

what your country can do for you; ask what you can do for your country," at least when we think of the state in economic terms. While political loyalty as an emotive force may still have power, and may still

be desirable,' 5 especially when it results in solidarity, benevolence and
altruism, it is no longer blind; it increasingly asks, "what's in it for me
or my family, or my co-religionists or my municipality, at least in the
" "Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction." Douglass C. North, Institutions, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 97 (1991).
10 For a general history of sovereignty, see CHARLES E. MERRIAM. HISTORY OF THE THEORY
OF SOVEREIGNTY SINCE ROUSSEAU (1900). See also Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 16481948, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 20 (1948).
11 For a history of sovereignty designed to show that the definition of sovereignty is not fixed,
see J.Samuel Barkin and Bruce Cronin, The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and the
Rules of Sovereignty in InternationalRelations, 48 INT'L ORG. 107 (1994).
12 See Felix Cohen, Letter to the editor, 5 FORDHAM L. REv. 548, 549 (1936) (explaining
that "in actual practice I have never found it necessary or useful to assume that a corporation is
anything more than a bundle of legal relationships between actual human beings. The bundle of
relationships exists, but it is not a human being.").
" See JEAN BODIN. THE SIX BoOKES OF A COMMONWEALE A75 (Eng. trans. 1606, corrected
by Kenneth D. McRae 1962).
14 See, e.g., DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: HOW THE ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR (1992).
16 Such loyalty may be desirable insofar as it concentrates and enables benevolent attitudes
that would be lost by dispersion if sought to be applied to a larger group.
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long run?"
Another discomfort we have with Bodin's notion of sovereignty is
its exclusivity: the subjects are bound by no other law. This exclusivity
rejects the idea of international law or institutions that can bind sovereigns, and also rejects the problem of conflicts of law. Instead, it posits
a sovereign that may choose to comply with international law, or to
apply foreign law, but is not bound to do either. It is clearly dualist in
its vision, and moreover demands the supremacy, even in international
law, of domestic law.
Along with the domestic sovereignty of unilateral domination
came a concept of international law as a means of subordination of
states. This essay articulates a different, less Hobbesian, view of both
domestic and international law. Domestic law is not simply a unilateral
emanation from the ruler, the sovereign. While it never has been so, it
is now recognized that domestic law involves issues of legitimacy and
implementation that require a bilateral process of communication and
negotiation, between the governed and the governor. Indeed, in a democracy, the governor is at least in part a tool or conduit for the governed, and the term "the governed," connoting unilateral rule, becomes
inappropriate. The extent to which the governor is not a tool or conduit
for the governed, described by the literature of public choice, is a measure of the defectiveness of a particular system of democratic politics,
unless the distortion is intended to constrain democratic politics. Indeed, we never were limited to a choice between voice and exit, 16 just
as we never have been limited to a choice between the firm and the
market. 17 Rather, the menu of modes of social relationship is infinite,
with many subtle variations.18
In international law - in the world of external, as opposed to internal, sovereignty-as well, the better view is not of a state
subordinate to international law, but of a state participating in international society, both forming and complying with law. This vision of law,
less Hobbesian and more Rousseauvian or Lockean, is much more subtle and nuanced, and reflects the complexity of both domestic and in16

ALBERT

0.

HIRSCHMAN. EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS.

ORGANIZATIONS AND STATES

See

(1970).

(1988), incorporating and
commenting upon earlier work, including Coase's seminal articles: The Nature of the Firm, 4
ECONOMICA 386 (1937) and The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960). Coase
explains that these articles are related. "In order to explain why firms exist and what activities
they undertake, I found it necessary to introduce. . . " the concept that has come to be known as
7

RONALD COASE. THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAW

'transaction costs'." Id. at 6.
18 Thus, real law has little to do with Bodin's sovereignty, which involves simply the emanation of orders and the clarification or application of orders. Real law is a social contractarian
transaction in which rules are established interactively, and are interpreted and applied in accordance with an objective system. The very objectivity of the process by which law is made diminishes the exclusive power of the legislator.
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ternational society. It also enables us to solve the conundrum posed by
sovereignty: if states are indeed absolutely sovereign, how can international law exist? It appears that states are indeed sovereign, but that
sovereignty itself is a malleable and limited concept. People are the
source of authority; to the extent that the state represents the aspirations of people, it should carry their authority. The converse is also
true.
Many have criticized the concept of sovereignty. Indeed, it is facile
to argue, as many have done, that sovereignty, and the sovereign state
with it, should simply be discarded. 19 However, while it is necessary to
critique our institutions and relentlessly to inquire as to whether they
are serving our needs, and perhaps also to demystify them, there also
may be legitimate reasons for conservatism. Law and economics scholars have evaluated the efficiency of the common law, finding that certain legal rules
developed by the common law meet their definitions of
"efficient." 2 0 It appears worthwhile to evaluate the possible efficiency of
sovereignty, to examine how the authority allocated to the state might
be justified or unjustified, resulting in the retention or reduction of sovereignty. This essay examines this authority in the context of international business regulation, and more specifically in the context of two
international business regulation problems: extraterritoriality and
subsidiarity.
Extraterritoriality and subsidiarity are, respectively, horizontal
and vertical challenges to, or affirmations of, sovereignty. Extraterritoriality refers to the fact that no state is autarkic or autarchic, but each
exists in a world filled with persons that penetrate the state at many
points. Two broad categories of response are available to contend with
these chaotic circumstances. First, the state may unilaterally, bilaterally or plurilaterally set rules for jurisdiction: these conflict of laws
rules may be based on territoriality, nationality or other parameters.
Second, the state may unilaterally, bilaterally or plurilaterally establish
common substantive rules. Either of these techniques, like the establishment of any international legal rule or institution, is a form of integration. Subsidiarity responds to the question of how far the state
should proceed in this integration."
19 Both the word and the concept of sovereignty have been amply criticized. Louis Henkin
argues that in addition to some validity, "sovereignty has also grown a mythology of state grandeur and aggrandizement that misconceives the concept and clouds what is authentic and worthy
in it, a mythology that is often empty and sometimes destructive of human values." He goes on to
write "[a]way with the 'S' word!" See, e.g., Louis Henkin, The Mythology of Sovereignty, Newsletter of the American Society of International Law, March-May 1993, at 1, 6-7.
'0 There is voluminous literature arguing the issue of the relative efficiency of the common
law, and its implications. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER. THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987); Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the
Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980).
21 See George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European
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This essay adopts the perspective of law and economics, developed
in the context of the analysis of business firms, to examine the state

and its authority, with particular reference to extraterritoriality and integration. The modern work on the theory of the firm began with Ron-

ald Coase's seminal work, The Nature of the Firm.22 In The Nature of

the Firm, Coase asked two analytical questions: first, why does the firm
exist, and second, if the firm should exist, why is not all production

organized in a single large firm? We may ask the same two questions
about the state: first, history aside, why does it exist, and second, to
what extent should international organization or integration take its

place? In The Nature of the Firm, Coase posits that the firm exists in
order to reduce transaction costs. This essay argues that the state also

exists to reduce transaction costs, calculated both internally and externally. This proposition provides a guiding principle in determining what
to do about extraterritoriality and what degree of international integra-

tion is appropriate.
However, an absolute formula for state sovereignty is not likely to
make sense, and different circumstances - different social goals, different types of communities, different technologies - demand different
formulae. Different formulae are obviously needed from an internal
standpoint, although they make inter-national social life more difficult.
A degree of homogeneity among states facilitates inter-national social

life, and may be justified internally as a means to achieve community
goals that require inter-national coordination.
III.

SOVEREIGNTY AND EXTRATERRITORIALITY

Sovereignty is threatened in two ways in connection with extraterritoriality problems.23 First, when State A seeks to apply its laws to
conduct that occurs in State B, State B may feel its sovereignty
threatened. Its sovereignty is threatened by the projection of State A's
Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 332 (1994).
22 Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937), reprinted in Coase,
supra note 17.
23 "Extraterritoriality" is a highly inaccurate word to describe the topic at hand. First, "extraterritoriality" has no generally agreed meaning. The reason is that we lack a clear definition of
"territoriality". Territoriality refers to a relationship with territory. However, any particular legal
or physical person, or any particular transaction, may have multiple relationships with one, two or
several separate territories. One way to regard extraterritoriality is to view it broadly, as Professor
Brilmayer and Mr. Norchi have done: "As used here, a case involves extraterritoriality when at
least one relevant event occurs in another nation." Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal
Extraterritorialityand Fifth Amendment Due Process, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1217, 1218 n.3
(1992). While this definition is quite broad, it recognizes the problem that many "relevant" events
may occur in another jurisdiction, giving rise to a degree of doubt with respect to any exercise of
jurisdiction. The real question is to assess the magnitude of the degree of doubt, and to determine
what to do in light of doubt.

406
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sovereignty into its territory.2 4 Second, State A may feel its sovereignty
threatened by virtue of rules of State B law or of international law that
purport to restrain its regulation of foreign conduct that affects State
A.
Before proceeding further, we must recognize that "extraterritoriality" is an unsatisfactory term.15 First, "extraterritoriality" has no
generally agreed meaning. The reason is that we lack a clear definition
of "territoriality." Territoriality refers to a relationship with territory.
However, any particular legal or physical person, or any particular
transaction, may have multiple relationships with one, two or several
separate territories. Second, territoriality itself is not a coherent concept. There is no assurance that a relationship to territory should be the
touchstone of prescriptive jurisdiction. Prescriptive jurisdiction2" exercised on the basis of nationality (as opposed to residence) of the subject
or the object of a given action or condition may have an attenuated or
negligible relationship to the regulating state's territory, although nationality is generally unchallenged as a basis for jurisdiction. Thus, it is
not territory that we should be concerned with, but people and societies, and territory is an increasingly inaccurate proxy for a community.
In fact, society is increasingly varied and plural, existing at many vertical levels and in many functional sectors, and with increasing disregard
for national boundaries.2 7
Thus, "extraterritoriality" is an unsatisfactory reference, often
used to connote dissatisfaction with the scope of prescriptive jurisdiction being exercised. It should be replaced with a more refined concept
of over-extended jurisdiction or "excess of jurisdiction": there are certainly circumstances where one community takes excessive control over
matters that have implications for other communities. The difficulty is
that of allocating jurisdiction: it is necessary to seek greater accuracy
" See, e.g., Kurt M. Hoechner, A Swiss Perspective on Conflicts of Jurisdiction, 50 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBs. 271 (1987).
'5 In fact, one argument of this chapter is that very few assertions of jurisdiction should be
considered extraterritorial in an absolute sense, although many assertions of jurisdiction may be
excessive in light of their relative connections with the society exercising jurisdiction.
" Prescriptive jurisdiction, also sometimes referred to as legislative jurisdiction or subject
matter jurisdiction (although these latter two concepts are different) is defined and distinguished
in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, § 401 (1987). Generally, it is the power
to make national law applicable to particular persons or circumstances. U.S. assertion of prescriptive jurisdiction on the basis of territorial effects is often criticized by other governments or by
commentators as "extraterritorial" or excessive. See, e.g., HOMER MOYER. JR. & LINDA MABRY.

EXPORT CONTROLS AS INSTRUMENTS OF FOREIGN POLICY,

App. 8-11 (1985) (explaining diplo-

matic objections to U.S. extraterritorial export controls). For a thoughtful overview of this topic,
see Gary B. Born, A Reappraisalof the ExtraterritorialReach of U.S. Law, 24 L. & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 1 (1992).
27 See Joel P. Trachtman, L'Etat, C'Est Nous: Sovereignty, Economic Integration and Subsidiarity, 33 HARV. INT'L L. J. 459 (1992).
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in allocating jurisdiction.2 8
Despite its indeterminacy, "extraterritoriality", as generally used,

refers to at least a sector of the most serious question in social studies.
This is the question of the scope of a state's jurisdiction: how far does
the state's power extend? This durable question is often addressed in
the domestic sector by law and economics when law and economics
considers the relationship between the individual and her domestic government: what activity should be regulated and what rules should be
left to private ordering by market forces? We see this question arise in
the area of economic law, such as antitrust law, securities law or environmental regulation. It is necessary to consider the same question the scope of the state's power -

from the standpoint of international

society.29 This question is most often raised in connection with the application of U.S. law to conduct that takes place largely abroad, although there are indications that, as their regulatory structures grow,

other countries or jurisdictions will increasingly grapple with similar
questions.30
This essay suggests a single articulated effects test 3 l as such a
However, this effects test ultimately merges with the balancing
that have been developed to compete with or to qualify the effects
as it incorporates the components of the balancing tests that have

rule.
tests
test,
sub-

28 See Joel P. Trachtman, Conflict of Laws and Accuracy in the Allocation of Government
VAND. J.TRANSNAT'L L. 975 (1994).

Responsibility, 26

29I have argued elsewhere that there is a continuity, but not an equivalence, between the
question of whether an activity should be regulated and the question of at what level-the state or
some transnational level-the activity should be regulated. Joel P. Trachtman, International Regulatory Competition, Externalization and Jurisdiction, 34 HARV. INT'L L. J. 47 (1993).
30One might argue that the U.S. has not been an assertive hegemon, but has simply been a
pioneer in business regulation. In order to play this pioneering role domestically, the U.S. has had
to pioneer extraterritoriality. "You can tell the pioneers because they are the ones with the arrows
in their chests."
Other jurisdictions are increasingly addressing problems of extraterritoriality and dividing up
regulatory jurisdiction. See, e.g., Joined Cases 89, 104, 114, 116, 117 & 125-29/85, A. Ahlstrdm
Osakeyhtio v. Commission (The "Wood Pulp" Cases), 1988 E.C.R. 5193, 4 Comm. Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 14,491 (1988) (without actually using these words, applying an effects-type test, to determine jurisdiction under European Community competition laws). In addition, the harmonization
efforts of the European Community would not be possible without an approach to dividing up
regulatory jurisdiction. Often, regulatory jurisdiction is allocated to the home state of the good or
of the person providing the relevant service, with other member states accepting the exclusive
nature of this allocation of regulatory jurisdiction under the principle of "mutual recognition."
Essentially harmonization and mutual recognition are the cornerstones of the integrative thrust
under the Single European Act of 1986 leading to the culmination of the "1992" program. Single
European Act, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (NO. L 169) 1, 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
21,000
(1987). See Jacques Pelkmans, The New Approach to Technical Harmonization and Standardization, 25 J. COMM. MKT. STUD. 251 (1987).
21 For a recent analysis of the effects test, see Russell J.Weintraub, The Extraterritorial
Application of Antitrust & Security Laws: An Inquiry Into the Utility of a "Choice-of-Law"
Approach, 70 Tax. L. REV. 1799 (1992).
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stantive validity, and at the same time adds a quantitative, comparative
element to balancing tests. The rule advanced here seeks to establish a

full set of categories of real effects, and calls for the valuation of each
type of effect. Once effects are identified and valued, they can be compared. The rule advanced here would allow jurisdiction in proportion to
effects. It can be stated as follows: Prescriptive jurisdiction over a
transaction should be allocated to the government(s) whose constituents
are affected by the transaction, pro rata in proportion to the relative
magnitude of such effects, as accurately as is merited given transaction

costs in allocation of prescriptive jurisdiction. 2

This rule is less a test than a measure, to determine not whether

jurisdiction exists, but how much jurisdiction exists. Of course, in some
cases, a relatively small amount of jurisdiction may not be worthwhile
to be exercised, given transaction costs. This rule is advanced based on

law and economics principles.3" This rule could be incorporated in international law, multilaterally, regionally or bilaterally, or could be ap-

plied unilaterally by individual countries as part of their domestic
law.3 4 This rule could even be said to have social contractarian or even

constitutional-type underpinnings, as it relates the powers of a society
to the purposes of that society.

Viewing law as a public good -

as the product of or even as a

factor of production owned by governments - provides an important
analogy to the private sector. In the private sector, the law of property
rights determines the initial distribution of goods and rights.3 5 In the
intergovernmental sector, the allocation of prescriptive jurisdiction determines the initial distribution of power.3" In both cases, the Coase
32 This statement is similar to, but distinct from, Professor Baxter's comparative impairment
approach, William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1963),
and the approach suggested by Prof. Alexander. Gregory S. Alexander, The Concept of Function
and the Basis of Regulatory Interests Under Functional Choice-of-Law Theory: The Significance
of Benefit and the Insignificance of Intention, 65 VA. L. REV. 1063, 1080 (1979) (stating that
"Choice-of-law theory therefore must recognize a basis for allocating regulatory authority to a
state whenever that allocation would further the state's goals or achieve some beneficial social
effect that is consistent with the state's conception of public welfare"). The author has articulated
this approach in greater detail as a general conflict of laws rule, and compared it with other
conflict of laws rules, in Trachtman, supra note 28.
33 While the rule advanced addresses the question of efficiency in jurisdiction, it leaves open
the question of efficiency in administration. The question of efficiency in administration can be
addressed by analysis of appropriate institutions.
3, We do not analyze in this chapter the question of whether unilateralism, or an approach of
reciprocity, or multilateralism, would be the best approach for an individual state to take. The
answer to this question would depend on game theory, and the relative value of unilateral action
versus reciprocation. See LEA BRILMAYER. CONFLICT OF LAWS: FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS (1991).

11 See Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property
Rights, 14 J. LEG. STUD. 13 (1985).
3' We may consider here familiar governmental powers, such as the power to tax, the power
to regulate and the power to enforce these prescriptive powers. The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
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Theorem would indicate that, absent transaction costs, this initial allocation of property rights would not have efficiency ramifications.3 7 The
reason that this initial allocation would, in theory, not affect efficiency,
is that market participants would engage in reallocative transactions
that would result in an efficient outcome. Thus, in the intergovernmental sector, if it is clear that the laws of State B govern a particular
transaction that imposes costs on State A, State A may pay State B to
prohibit the transaction.
Coase further argues (perhaps somewhat inconsistently) that, "if
market transactions were costless, all that matters (questions of equity
apart) is that the rights of the various parties should be well defined
and the results of legal actions easy to forecast."3 8 In the intergovernmental sector, this is an argument that the specifics of the rules allocating prescriptive jurisdiction are irrelevant, so long as their results are
predictable and their application is administrable. However, as Coase
noted with respect to the private sector, transaction costs exist. In fact,
they may be greater in the intergovernmental sector. In connection
with the private sector, Coase notes that legal decisions should be made
with a view to "reduce the need for market transactions and thus reduce the employment of resources in carrying them out."3'9 "The same
approach which, with zero transaction costs, demonstrates that the allocation of resources remains the same whatever the legal position, also
shows that, with positive transaction costs, the law plays a crucial role
in determining how resources are used." 4 °
Thus, rules allocating prescriptive jurisdiction in the intergovernmental sector may be equated with property rights in the private sector: each determines which decision-maker initially controls the use of
factors of production. The goal of rules allocating prescriptive jurisdiction in this context is to minimize transaction costs, in order to maximize the extent to which transactions that may result in optimal allocation of the factors of production of public goods occur. Rules allocating
prescriptive jurisdiction may achieve this goal in two ways.

§§ 401-403 (1987) divides jurisdiction into three components: jurisdiction to prescribe, jurisdiction to adjudicate and jurisdiction to enforce.
3" COASE, supra note 17, at 95-185 (reprinting and commenting on The Problem of Social
Cost, 3 J. L. &. ECON. 1 (1960)).
38 Id. at 119. Indeed, even this may be too conservative a position. In the absence of transaction costs, even property rights may be unnecessary to be specified. Steven N.S. Cheung, Will
China Go "Capitalist"?37, Hobart Paper No. 94 (1986). Thus, in a world without transaction
costs, not only is the firm unnecessary, but law, the state and international law are also unnecessary. As Coase says, "[i]t would not seem worthwhile to spend much time investigating the
properties of such a world." Coase, supra note 17, at 15.
39 Coase, supra note 17, at 119.
40 Id. at 178. Coase argues that with positive transaction costs, the "market transactions" by
which private action would reallocate resources may become too costly to effect.
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First, rules allocating prescriptive jurisdiction may, by their predictability, administrability and transparency, facilitate "market" transactions that reallocate authority. In the intergovernmental sector,
"market" transactions are agreements allocating authority: treaties,
constitutions, uniform laws, practices (such as comity41 ) or other
means of circumscribing claims of authority. The extent to which
rules allocating prescriptive jurisdiction satisfy this condition is referred to herein as "predictability". Administrability and transparency may be considered as incorporated in predictability.
" Second, rules allocating prescriptive jurisdiction may provide starting positions - allocations of authority - that reduce transaction
costs by obviating the need to transact. The extent to which rules
allocating prescriptive jurisdiction provide such allocations amounts
to "accuracy" in this context.
We may relate the first method - predictability - to the prisoner's dilemma used by game theory.4 2 If each prisoner is able to know
what her comrade intends to do, and to bind her comrade to cooperative action through a binding contract, the negotiation of an optimal
solution will be facilitated and the prisoner's dilemma will be resolved.
Thus, rules allocating prescriptive jurisdiction that are predictable, administrable and transparent will allow State B to negotiate an exchange with State A, whereby State A changes its rule of substantive
law for application to a particular class of transactions, and State B
confers something of value on State A. 43 On the other hand, rules allocating prescriptive jurisdiction that are unpredictable or opaque because they are result-oriented ("substantive", using Prof. Juenger's terminology44 ), or that depend on an analysis of forum policy that has not
yet been undertaken (as in balancing tests or reasonableness tests absent the role of binding precedent), reduce the ability of states to negotiate such exchanges.
The second method - accuracy - seeks to establish in advance
an allocation of authority that market participants - governments would come to themselves in the absence of transaction costs. It is thus
a theoretical exercise that might, if it were not for transaction costs, be

"

41 Here, we may consider comity as a method of communication, perhaps but not necessarily

including an element of reciprocity.
42 For an explanation of the prisoner's dilemma, See R. LUCE

AND

H. RAIFFA. GAMES

AND

DECISIONS (1957); see also R. AXELROD. THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 27 (1984). Essentially, the prisoner's dilemma is a game theoretic illustration of a circumstance in which each
player's individual choices are less attractive in an aggregate sense than cooperation, if the players
fail to cooperate, their aggregate welfare is diminished.
" For example, if the United States and Brazil could agree that Brazil owes no obligation to
the U.S. to protect its rain forest, or its biodiversity, negotiations could proceed with greater clarity, albeit to the greater cost of the U.S.
14 See FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER. CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE 191-237 (1993);
Friedrich Juenger, What Now?, 46 OHIO ST. L. REV. 509 (1985).
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subject to empirical testing on the basis of whether the initial allocation
of authority is revised through subsequent negotiation. In fact, predictability is subsumed within accuracy. One component of accuracy - of
determining the most stable allocation of jurisdictional competences is determining how to make these allocations predictable. These factors
-

they are all components of accuracy -

should be traded off against

one another in order to minimize transaction costs and achieve efficient
allocation of authority. The optimum tradeoff between these factors
may be defined as accuracy. By definition, "accurate" allocations
would be relatively stable - there would be nothing to be gained by
renegotiating them. What theoretical allocation of authority is most
likely to be relatively stable? We might begin by seeking to assess what
allocations would be unstable.45
First, an allocation of authority is likely to be unstable if it fails to
accord an appropriate measure of authority to a government whose
constituents are affected by the circumstance in question. This is nothing less than the principle that each community should have control
over its own destiny, and be able to negotiate with other communities,
or foreign individuals, when their destinies collide. The term "affected"
must be interpreted very broadly, to include not just the frustration of
a positive governmental policy, but any harmful effects that a constituent would pay to abate, including frustration of a decision, or of a laissez faire "policy." We normally think of these effects as "externalities." Conversely, (and illustrating that this is, in Coase's terms, a
"problem of a reciprocal nature"), an allocation of authority is likely to
be unstable if it accords authority to a government whose constituents
are not affected, in derogation from the authority of a government
whose constituents are affected. 46 Thus, for example, a rule that allocated all jurisdiction to a government on the basis of territorial conduct, where the territorial effects occurred in another state's territory,
would be unstable.47
It is important to note that a stable system would not, like Professor Baxter's comparative impairment approach,48 measure the effects
on each state and simply award plenary authority to the state most
affected. 49 Greater complexity must be embraced in order to avoid
'5 Baxter's methodology of hypothetical negotiations seems to be an appropriate tool. Baxter,
supra note 32.
46 This is Currie's disinterested third state problem. See Brainerd Currie, The Disinterested
Third State, 28 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 754 (1963).
47 Of course, the affected state might resort to diplomacy or to retaliation, and thereby indirectly exercise jurisdiction. Thus, the instability is not necessarily absolute, but relative, depending
on the transaction costs incurred to resort to diplomacy or retaliation, as the case may be.
48 Baxter, supra note 32.
49 Of course, each of the conflict of laws systems discussed here, or otherwise known to the

author, would assign full authority to one or more jurisdictions, but would not Solomonically divide authority among jurisdictions.
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moral hazard, illegitimacy, and consequently, instability. Accuracy will
be enhanced by a kind of depeqage5" (let us call it "nouveau depeqage") that spreads authority, pro rata, to all governments whose constituents are affected. 5 1 Shared effects indicate a need for shared
authority. 52
Second, an allocation might be unstable to the extent that it allocates authority to a government other than the government that holds a
"comparative advantage" in regulating the subject matter. These may
be first mover advantages, 5 3 advantages due to greater experience with
the type of business or type of regulatory problem or other advantages
in regulating.
Thus, accuracy in allocation of authority horizontally calls for
analysis of effects on different societies horizontally. We find below
that accuracy in allocation of authority vertically - subsidiarity similarly calls for analysis of effects vertically. Of course, one type of
effect on the vertical scale is the effect of horizontally coordinated activity: horizontal coordination amounts to an ascent along the vertical
scale.
IV.

SOVEREIGNTY AND SUBSIDIARITY

In the context discussed here, the principle of subsidiarity is a basis for retaining the state as a social institution, as well as a guide for
determining what functions should be allocated to the state. It is a
methodological guide to reconciling the continued existence of the state
with the rise of transnational society. Jacques Delors, President of the
European Commission during the formulation and implementation of
the single market project, as well as the Maastricht Treaty on European Union, has indicated that subsidiarity is a basis for reconciling
the state and lower levels of organization with transnational society:
I often have the occasion to return to federalism as method, including
the principle of subsidiarity. I see there the inspiration to reconcile
that which appears very much irreconcilable: the emergence of a
" Depeqage is normally associated with the application of laws of different states to resolve
different issues in the same case. See, e.g., Willis Reese, Depeqage: A Common Phenomenon in
choice of Law, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 58 (1973). Here, I use the term to refer to the application of
laws of different states to resolve the same issue in the same case.
51 Of course, this is the way shareholders vote in corporations and banks vote in syndicates:
each has control in proportion to the extent to which it is affected. Share ownership and loan
commitments measure both voting rights and economic interests, ensuring that these are
congruent.
"3See, e.g., Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON.
416, 423 (1956) (indicating that where externalities are of sufficient importance, "some form of
integration may be indicated."). See also, Trachtman, supra note 29, at 71.
11 See Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the IncorporationPuzzle, I J. L.
ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985).
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united Europe and loyalty to our nation, to our fatherland; the neces-

sity of a European power to be applied to the problems of our times,
and the imperative to keep our nations and our regions.54
It would not be necessary to establish a general formula for determining at what level particular issues should be governed, if it were
possible to negotiate in advance and list the areas to be governed at
each level. If subsidiarity is viewed as establishing a rule that issues
should be addressed at the level where they can be addressed most effectively, this principle establishes a competition for governmental effectiveness among levels of government. In order to understand the basis for and effects of this competition, it is important to consider how
effectiveness is to be measured.
Of course, effectiveness cannot be measured simply in terms of economic efficiency, without assessing a broader range of values that may
be described as effectiveness in implementing social policy. Here, we
encounter the same types of problems as those referred to above in assessing "effects" in order to allocate jurisdiction horizontally. In both
the horizontal and vertical scale, we are seeking to assess the relative
magnitude of effects on different societies, and to allocate jurisdiction
in a manner designed to maximize their achievement of social policy.
Defining social policy for these purposes is the difficult task.
Clearly, different social groups - families, villages, cities, sub-national
regions, states and supra-national regions - will have varying preference sets or utility functions. However, to some extent, these preference
sets will intersect, indicating agreed social policy. Given subsidiarity
measured in terms of effectiveness in satisfying a given common preference set, there will always be some benefit in regulating at varying
levels, to take advantage of varying combinations of preference sets.
While there might be unacceptable transaction costs and excessive
complexity associated with a great multiplicity of levels of social organization, it would appear useful to have at least several levels of social
organization, to capture the benefits of varying combinations of preference sets. This indicates a need for flexibility and experimentation in
allocating functions to varying levels of sub-state units, as well as varying levels of supra-state units, such as regional and functional
organizations.
V.

VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL INSTITUTIONAL COMPETITION

Can we write the theory of the firm large, as the theory of the
state, or as the theory of institutions, including global ones? 55 In this
Speech by President Jacques Delors at the opening of the 40th academic year of the College of Europe, Bruges, Belgium (Oct. 17, 1989) (translation by author).
I See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN ECONOMIC HISTORY (1981) for a
discussion of the state as an economic institution. North has stated that "[a] satisfactory theory of
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sense, we can consider the theory of the state, along the lines described
by Ronald Coase, as informed by the social contractarian problem of
determining whether the state or some other type of organization sub-state, supra-state or trans-state - entails the lowest social costs.
Surely the state expresses a much broader range of human needs and
aspirations than most firms. However, the role of the state is increasingly viewed as economic, and even to the significant extent that it is
not, the transaction costs basis for the theory of the firm is not restricted to transaction costs relating to economic transactions.
If we assume that each type of institution - the firm and the state
exists to reduce transaction costs, then the best firms and the best
states are those that reduce transaction costs the most. Thus, the states
that provide the most efficient institutional economic structures are the
best. While this may appear a call for unmitigated competition among
states to provide the most efficient structures, the competition need not
be unmitigated. Consider three qualifications. First, the competition is
not merely horizontal among states. According to the principal of subsidiarity, it is also vertical among states and sub- and supra-national
units. Second, different groups of people populating states will have varying preferences. 6 Third, the best states (those that best transmit
their citizens' aspirations) will recognize that the first qualification
means that they cannot provide the most efficient structures without
transferring sovereignty to sub- and supra-national units in some
fields.5 7 Selective cooperation among states is necessary to provide the
most efficient product: the most efficient regulation. 8
If, as Coase indicates, the firm and the market are simply two
alternate ways to organize production in such a way as to minimize
transaction costs, perhaps we may add another alternative: the state.
Indeed, there are many alternatives that involve complex interactions
of firm, market, state and other social units: within an economic system, none of these methods of allocation operates in isolation. The
the firm would be a long step toward the development of a theory of the state." Douglass C.
North, A Frameworkfor Analyzing the State in Economic History, 16 EXPLORATIONS IN ECON.
HIsT. 249 (1979) (citations omitted).
" "The study of transaction cost economizing is thus a comparative institutional undertaking
which recognizes that there are a variety of distinguishably different transactions on the one hand,
and a variety of alternative governance structures on the other. The object is to match governance

structures to the attributes of transactions in a discriminating way."
NOMIC ORGANIZATION 140
57 This process indeed

OLIVER WILLIAMSON.

Eco-

(1986).
appears to be occurring through the European Community, GATT
and other less global (geographically and functionally) structures.
58A remaining question is what incentives the state has to maximize citizen welfare at the
expense of the state's autonomy? Perfect democracy would make this question unnecessary. However, even without perfect democracy, the incentives include the discipline of imperfect democracy, fortified by greater dissemination of information regarding the relative success of other
states, as well as greater international trade.
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state's power and responsibility depends on its ability to bring people
together to get what they want: to maximize social preferences on the
horizontal (extraterritoriality) and vertical (subsidiarity) axes simultaneously. No single formula, no single definition of "sovereignty" can
possibly achieve this goal. Thus, sovereignty must be dynamic and
variable.

